Security News

US Senate Committee Advances FCC Nominee and Telecom Cyber Bills Despite Democratic Boycott

CyberScoop · 19 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway Do not wait for regulation to improve your telecom security: ask your carriers and providers what security assurances they offer, and plan as if your communications could be monitored.

Republicans on the US Senate Commerce Committee have advanced the nomination of Danielle Thumann Severs to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), along with a group of technology and cybersecurity bills. Democrats boycotted the hearing, which puts the future of the bills in doubt even though many had bipartisan sponsors. Democrats will hold the Senate majority gavel in January.

If confirmed, Thumann Severs would give Republicans and chair Brendan Carr a 3-1 majority on the five-member commission. Anna Gomez, a Biden administration holdover, would remain the only Democrat. The Trump administration also broke with precedent by not naming a Democratic nominee alongside Thumann Severs. Committee chair Sen. Ted Cruz argued that the president is not legally required to nominate commissioners in pairs.

The most relevant bill for security teams is the Telecommunications Cybersecurity and Resilience Act, sponsored by Cruz and Sen. Mark Warner. It would create a working group at the US Department of Commerce to develop industry best practices for telecommunications cybersecurity. The group would also set criteria for independent third-party certifications and assessors. The bill arrives after Salt Typhoon, a Chinese hacking group, was found to have infiltrated US telecommunications infrastructure and spied on senior officials. Congress and the FCC chose voluntary partnerships over new rules, and the FCC rescinded requirements introduced late in the Biden administration.

Other bills include the COLLUDE Act, which would remove Section 230 liability protections for social media companies that moderate content at government request. The Chip EQUIP Act would bar recipients of CHIPS Act funding from using chip manufacturing equipment from companies controlled by China, Russia, Iran or North Korea.

Why it matters

The Salt Typhoon intrusions showed that the carrier networks businesses rely on can be compromised, yet the US response so far has leaned on voluntary measures and rolled back mandatory requirements. Anyone assuming regulation will soon force carriers to raise their security baseline should note that the one bill aimed at this gap, which would set up best practices and third-party certification, now faces an uncertain path. Security leaders need to treat carrier security as an unverified supply chain risk for now.

What to do

  • Review which sensitive business communications travel unencrypted over carrier networks.
  • Ask your telecommunications providers what security practices and independent assessments they can demonstrate.
  • Track the Telecommunications Cybersecurity and Resilience Act as a possible source of future certification criteria.
Salt Typhoon FCC telecommunications US policy cybersecurity legislation
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Summarised by CISO AI from CyberScoop, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.