Security News

US agency shows post-quantum encryption can run on existing smart cards, but visibility gaps remain

CyberScoop · 18 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway Start now by listing where your business uses encryption, because you cannot upgrade protections you cannot find.

As US federal agencies rework their plans for post-quantum encryption, the General Services Administration (GSA) says it has shown that new protections can work on older technology. Dan Pomeroy, a deputy associate administrator at the agency, said the GSA started with the smart Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards that let employees enter facilities, use computers and sign official documents.

According to Pomeroy, technologists ran new post-quantum algorithms directly on the card chip, issued new credentials, and built the policies, certifications and hardware security modules needed to support them. He told the FedTalks event that quantum-resistant credentials are achievable with the cards and technology available today. He added that the government must keep testing for bugs and interoperability problems, and that contractors are expected to use post-quantum algorithms from the start.

The work is under time pressure. An executive order issued earlier this year moved the federal deadline for finishing the transition from 2035 to 2030, cutting the time agencies had by more than half. Google has set an internal target of 2029. Post-quantum cryptography generally needs larger keys and signatures, and a fast, reliable network connection. That could be a problem for assets such as satellites with weaker links, though in many cases agencies can change algorithms on the systems and devices they already use.

Vanessa Hunt of IBM said many agencies have blind spots, especially where the sensitivity of data outlives the protection around it. Encryption is spread across datasets, identities, infrastructure and networks, which makes it hard to map what needs upgrading. In her words, it is easier to know where sensitive data lives than where the cryptography protecting it is.

Why it matters

The GSA result undercuts the assumption that post-quantum migration means replacing all hardware, so delay justified by legacy kit is harder to defend. The bigger obstacle is the one IBM describes: organisations know where sensitive data is but not which cryptography guards it. Leaders with long-lived sensitive data, and those facing the 'harvest now, decrypt later' risk, are exposed first, and a compressed timeline forces them to build a cryptographic inventory before they can plan anything else.

What to do

  • Build an inventory of where encryption protects your sensitive data, across systems, identities and networks.
  • Identify data whose sensitivity will outlast its current encryption and prioritise it for migration.
  • Ask suppliers and contractors whether their products will use post-quantum algorithms from the start.
  • Check whether any low-bandwidth or constrained devices could struggle with larger keys and signatures.
post-quantum cryptography encryption PIV cards GSA harvest now decrypt later

Summarised by CISO AI from CyberScoop, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.