Security News

UK tribunal forces government to admit it served Apple with a secret encryption order

The Register · 20 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway Check which of your staff's cloud data is end-to-end encrypted and which is held by the provider, because the latter can be disclosed under legal demands.

The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) has confirmed that the UK government served Apple with a secret Technical Capability Notice (TCN). The three judges rejected the Home Office's argument that acknowledging the notice would damage national security. They pointed to extensive public reporting, statements by US officials, and media briefings they concluded the UK government had authorised.

A TCN is issued under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and compels companies to make technical changes that support the government's legal surveillance powers. The order has been widely reported as demanding access to end-to-end encrypted iCloud data. The story broke in February 2025, when The Washington Post reported the demand. That same month Apple withdrew Advanced Data Protection (ADP) for UK users, which was widely read as indirect confirmation.

ADP extends end-to-end encryption to more iCloud data, including backups, photos and notes, so only trusted devices hold the keys. Without it, Apple holds the keys and can hand over content in response to valid legal demands. Some categories stay end-to-end encrypted either way. In August 2025, then US intelligence director Tulsi Gabbard said the UK had agreed to drop its demand for access to Americans' encrypted data, and ADP remains available in the US. The Financial Times reported in October 2025 that the UK had replaced the original notice with one focused on British users.

The judgment does not reveal what the notice demands. The judges agreed some material must stay secret, but said not every detail needs to be, and it is not yet practical to draw that line. A substantive hearing is expected in the first half of 2027, and Apple filed a second claim in July 2026. A separate challenge to the TCN regime has been brought by Liberty, Privacy International and two individuals. The government says the powers have strict safeguards and that the notice simply requires Apple to maintain its ability to help police and intelligence agencies.

Why it matters

Businesses assuming that cloud backups, photos and notes are out of the provider's reach may be wrong: once a provider withdraws end-to-end encryption, it holds the keys and can disclose that content under a valid legal demand. The case shows a vendor's security feature can be removed by a legal order, not just a technical failure. Leaders handling sensitive client or commercial information on staff devices need to decide which protection they actually rely on.

What to do

  • Review whether staff devices use Apple's Advanced Data Protection and where it is unavailable.
  • Identify which iCloud data categories remain end-to-end encrypted without ADP, using Apple's published explainer.
  • Move highly sensitive business files out of consumer cloud backups into systems where you control the encryption keys.

Summarised by CISO AI from The Register, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.