Threat Intelligence

Token-replay campaign hit 97 Microsoft 365 accounts across 79 organisations, with no endpoint compromised

Huntress · 18 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway If you suspect a token-replay compromise, revoke the user's sessions, reset the password, and then audit registered devices and MFA methods in Entra ID.

From July 14 to September 22, 2026, Huntress tracked a token-replay campaign targeting Microsoft 365 accounts across 79 organisations. A Microsoft alert, backed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center intelligence, first surfaced it. Huntress reports that 97 accounts were compromised.

Attackers used techniques including adversary-in-the-middle phishing. A fake sign-in page relays the victim's login to Microsoft and captures the session token issued after the user completes MFA. By replaying that token, the attackers could access the account without a password or another MFA prompt. No customer endpoints were compromised, so no device did anything wrong.

Once inside, the attackers registered rogue devices and their own authenticator apps to keep access, then created inbox rules to hide their communications. In one case, an attacker used a hijacked mailbox to send a payroll-related email to an outside accountant and hid the accountant's replies. Huntress Managed ITDR detections first identified the activity, while Microsoft Entra ID Protection independently flagged the same attacker infrastructure as known threat actor IP addresses.

Huntress says the campaign prompted it to expand its Microsoft integration. Incidents from Defender for Identity, Office 365, Cloud Apps and Entra ID Protection now reach its analysts, even when no device is involved. Huntress notes that 85% of medium- and high-severity Defender incidents in a recent two-week period had no device-related evidence.

Why it matters

MFA did not fail here; the stolen post-MFA session token meant the attacker never faced a second challenge. Businesses relying on endpoint alerts alone would see nothing, since the target was the account and Huntress reports most serious Defender incidents carry no device evidence. A password reset alone leaves rogue devices and attacker-registered authenticators in place, so persistence must be removed separately.

What to do

  • Revoke the affected user's sessions and reset their password.
  • Audit registered devices and MFA methods in Entra ID for ones the user did not add.
  • Review mailboxes for inbox rules that hide messages or replies.
  • Check Entra ID Protection for sign-ins from known threat actor IP addresses.
token replay Microsoft 365 adversary-in-the-middle Entra ID identity security Microsoft Defender

Summarised by CISO AI from Huntress, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.