Threat Intelligence

Timeroasting Detection: Why Watching Packet Size Fails and Requested Account IDs Work

Huntress · 20 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway Log UDP/123 requests to your domain controllers and alert when the requested RID does not match the sender's own account.

Timeroasting abuses Microsoft's MS-SNTP time protocol. An attacker asks a domain controller (DC) to sign a time response for any computer or trust account, naming the target by its Relative Identifier (RID). The DC replies with a password-derived MAC, with no authentication needed, and the attacker cracks it offline. Because the targeted accounts never log on, there are no 4768, 4769, 4624 or 4776 events, which is why the attack has a reputation for being quiet.

Most public coverage focuses on the legacy 68-byte form, built with MD5, which hashcat mode 31300 can crack. Huntress highlights a second 120-byte extended form that uses an SP800-108 key derivation step followed by HMAC-SHA512. Microsoft added it as the preferred option, and modern Windows sends it by default. Its exact crypto was undocumented and hashcat had no module for it. A collector that assumes the legacy form could crack the wrong format and wrongly judge weak accounts to be safe.

A Huntress researcher reversed netlogon.dll and w32time.dll from a fully patched Windows Server 2025 DC to recover the extended crypto, proved it against live DC output, and published a reference implementation and a hashcat module. That makes the extended form as cheap to attack as the legacy one.

For defenders, the key point is that packet size is a poor signal, since modern members send the 120-byte form as normal time sync. A legitimate host only asks a DC to sign for its own machine account, so a request where the RID is not the sender's own catches a single packet, a slow sweep and both forms. Huntress notes that Microsoft Defender for Identity does not catch the unauthenticated sweep, and that only weak or non-rotating secrets on computer and trust accounts ever fall.

Why it matters

Organisations running Active Directory are exposed, especially those relying on Defender for Identity or authentication-event monitoring, because timeroasting produces no logon events and the sweep goes unseen. Detection built on the 68-byte legacy form or on volume breaks as soon as traffic uses the default 120-byte form or a slow sweep. The decision it forces is to collect and inspect time-protocol traffic at the DC and key on the own-RID mismatch.

What to do

  • Log UDP/123 requests to your domain controllers.
  • Alert when the RID in an MS-SNTP request differs from the sender's own account RID.
  • Baseline 120-byte authenticated NTP packets as normal member time sync rather than alerting on size.
  • Rotate weak or non-rotating computer and trust account secrets, since only those can be cracked.
timeroasting Active Directory MS-SNTP detection engineering hashcat Windows

Summarised by CISO AI from Huntress, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.