Star Blizzard Turns Stolen Cloud Accounts Into a Launchpad for Trusted-Contact Phishing
Google has published new analysis of Star Blizzard, a Russian cyber-espionage group also known as Coldriver, Callisto, Cold Relic and Gossamer Bear. The group targets people in policy-making and defence-related sectors across North America and Europe, and Google says it was still running new phishing operations as recently as November 2026.
The first intrusion, in late 2025, hit the cloud productivity environment of a US organisation. The attackers used a residential proxy network close to the victim and a stolen super admin password, then wore down the user with repeated multi-factor authentication (MFA) push requests until one was approved. With that access they downloaded the organisation's entire cloud drive, exported employee lists and started a domain-wide data export through Google Workspace Customer Takeout. They also deleted Alert Center notifications to hide their tracks, and kept access for several months.
The stolen material then fuelled the next attack. After the group was removed from the first victim, Google saw email accounts impersonating that organisation's employees contacting people in the same professional circles. In the second intrusion, the actor posed as an employee from the first victim, started a chat on a secure messaging app and eventually shared phishing links. These captured credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID, the victim's single sign-on provider for Google Workspace. The attacker then registered its own MFA device to keep access, and again bulk-downloaded files.
Google notes the group also hunts for rosters, contact lists, resumes and event schedules to build convincing pretexts for future targets. In its words, organisations must defend their entire identity estate holistically.
Why it matters
Push-based MFA failed here because a tired user simply approved a prompt, and a super admin account turned that single approval into whole-organisation data loss. The group also breaks the assumption that a message from a known contact or partner is safe, since the contact's own compromised mailbox supplied the pretext. Any business that sits in the supply chain of policy or defence organisations, or uses federated single sign-on, must treat identity and admin logging as the main line of defence.
What to do
- Review who holds super admin rights in your cloud tenant and remove it from anyone who does not need it.
- Alert on newly registered MFA devices in your single sign-on provider, since Star Blizzard added its own device to keep access.
- Monitor for mass file sharing to external addresses and for Google Workspace Customer Takeout or domain-wide data exports.
- Warn staff that unexpected repeated MFA prompts and links sent over messaging apps, even from known contacts, should be reported rather than approved.