Russian Espionage Group Turns One Stolen Google Workspace Into a Launchpad Against Trusted Partners
Google's Mandiant and Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) report that the Russia-linked group Cold Relic, also tracked as COLDRIVER, UNC4057, Callisto, Gossamer Bear and Star Blizzard, has used a single cloud compromise to fuel a chain of linked intrusions. In a 2026 investigation, the group used the staff directory, data and identities it had stolen from a US organization in late 2025 to attack another.
In the first breach, the attackers came in through a residential proxy network close to the victim. They used stolen Super Admin credentials and an MFA push notification fatigue attack, and gained access when the victim accepted an MFA request. They then registered their own device and used passkeys and MFA backup codes as alternative ways back in. With Super Admin rights, they downloaded the organization's entire cloud storage, partly by sharing files to an attacker-run email account. They also checked admin security and email audit logs to see what defenders could see, and viewed, modified and deleted Alert Center notifications to erase evidence. Full employee lists and domain-wide data were exported using Google Takeout, and access continued for several months.
Even after being removed, Cold Relic used email accounts impersonating the victim's employees to target staff and contacts in the same professional circles. This led to a second US organization that used Microsoft Entra ID as its single sign-on provider for Google Workspace. Posing as an employee of the first victim, the attacker contacted the target over a secure messaging app and sent phishing links, framed as a document about a technical issue, to harvest Entra ID credentials and tokens. After logging in, they registered a new MFA device and bulk downloaded files from the user's cloud drive.
Google says the campaign shows human-centred social engineering converging with cloud identity abuse. The messaging account used in the second attack was later renamed to a new persona, which Google suspects was used to target others in the same network.
Why it matters
Cold Relic undermines the assumption that a message from a known contact or partner is trustworthy, because stolen emails and staff lists make the lure convincing. The persistence methods (rogue MFA devices, passkeys, backup codes) mean a password reset alone may not evict an intruder. Any organization in a tight professional network is exposed, even if its own defences are strong, because a partner's breach becomes the route in.
What to do
- Review and remove unrecognized MFA devices, passkeys and backup codes on accounts, especially Super Admin and single sign-on accounts, after any suspected compromise.
- Check Admin Console security investigation and email audit logs for mass file sharing, Google Takeout exports and changes to Alert Center notifications.
- Train staff to refuse unexpected MFA push requests and report them rather than approve them.
- Verify unexpected document or technical issue requests from known contacts through a separate channel before clicking links.