Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Turned Trusted Website Script Into a Card Skimmer and iPhone Exploit Delivery Channel
A supply chain attack on Optimizely on 16 November turned a trusted experimentation script into a malware delivery channel. For nearly 19 hours, visitors to sites such as Zoom, BBC, CNN, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax loaded code that swapped cryptocurrency addresses, skimmed payment cards and pushed iOS exploit kits to iPhone and iPad users. Researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations, and Optimizely confirmed an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.
The attacker planted a small loader in the optional Project JavaScript setting across many unrelated customer projects. Nothing else changed, so browsers kept receiving what looked like a normal Optimizely file from the usual CDN host with Optimizely's own certificate. Self-hosting gave no protection: Scheels and Vodafone Australia serve the snippet from their own domains, and those copies were infected too because they are built from the same project data. Checkouts using a payment provider's hosted iframe kept card numbers away from the skimmer, while card fields built directly into a site's own pages were exposed.
The iOS stage routed devices on iOS 13 to 17 to the Coruna kit, iOS 18 devices to DarkSword, and iOS 26 devices to a chain that only fingerprints the device. Evidence confirms delivery of exploit pages, not successful compromise, and no public report yet confirms an infected device. On-chain records show the attacker's wallets received about US$7,150 in cryptocurrency. The number of stolen cards, cookies and screenshots, and of compromised iPhones, cannot be seen from outside, so the full impact is unknown.
The operator was active earlier too. An injector domain appeared in scripts from other third-party providers between 13 and 16 November, and first surfaced on Turkish websites on 17 September. By the time of the report, injected code had been removed from most projects, though TalkTalk's snippet still carried it. Researchers expect the true total of affected organisations to be higher.
Why it matters
Businesses that load marketing or testing scripts on payment pages are exposed, because the malicious code arrived from a trusted vendor under a valid certificate, so domain allowlisting and certificate checks saw nothing wrong. Self-hosting the snippet did not help since it was built from the same tampered project data, which breaks the assumption that hosting a vendor file yourself isolates you. It forces a decision about whether third-party JavaScript belongs on checkout pages at all.
What to do
- Review the Project JavaScript setting in your Optimizely projects for unexpected loaders, including references to webshell[.]lol.
- Move card entry to a payment provider's hosted iframe rather than fields built into your own pages.
- Check web logs and content security policy reports for connections to 1688360[.]cc.
- Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.