Optimizely Flaw Let Attackers Plant Card-Skimming and iPhone Exploit Code on 178 Websites
Researchers at Report URI say they found malicious JavaScript on 178 widely visited websites that run through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a platform companies use to personalise and manage their sites and apps. Optimizely confirmed it had "identified and contained a security incident" and said the vulnerable path is blocked, the injected code removed and affected customers contacted directly.
Report URI's Scott Helme described the code as a multi-purpose kit. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, and stole cookies and screenshots. On iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Report URI used blockchain evidence to trace at least $7,000 stolen. Affected sites included 32 finance or banking sites, plus technology, news, airline and retail companies. Helme said the first injected code appeared on Turkish websites in September, before the latest campaign on Monday.
The full damage is unknown. Helme said researchers cannot see how many cards were skimmed, how many cookies or screenshots were taken, or how many iOS devices were infected. DarkSword can infect a device when someone simply visits a compromised site, and Coruna is also delivered through web-based attacks. Most of the malicious code has been removed, but Helme urged Optimizely customers to check their websites.
Black Duck's Collin Hogue-Spears said the attacker's loader went into the Project JavaScript field, where customers add custom code. The skimmer reads forms the sites built themselves, while a payment processor's hosted iframe sits outside its reach. Affected companies must work out which pages loaded the infected snippet, for how long, and which card payments those pages took. The case resembles a recent Fandango incident, where card details were stolen through malicious code on a checkout page.
Why it matters
Any business that lets a third-party platform run code on its live pages has handed that vendor's security the same trust as its own, and this incident shows that trust can fail with no change on the customer's side. The attack also put visitors at risk beyond card theft, since iOS users could be infected just by loading a page. Because victims cannot see how many cards or devices were hit, affected companies must rebuild exposure from their own page and payment records rather than rely on the vendor.
What to do
- Check your Optimizely Project JavaScript field and site files for code you did not add.
- Identify which pages loaded the affected Optimizely snippet, for how long, and which card payments those pages took.
- Treat every card entered on your own payment form while the skimmer was live as exposed.
- Use a payment processor's hosted iframe for card entry, since the skimmer could not reach it.