Industry News

Optimizely Breach Turned 178 Trusted Websites Into Malware Delivery Points

Krebs on Security · 18 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway If your website loads third-party scripts, set a strict Content Security Policy so a compromised vendor cannot quietly load malicious code on your visitors.

On November 16, visitors to at least 178 well-known websites were served malicious code through Optimizely, a company that helps sites test new features and customise user experiences. Report URI researcher Scott Helme said the affected sites included the BBC, CNN, Equifax, Ledger and Zoom. Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.

According to Report URI, the payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. It delivered a multi-purpose malware kit that could steal payment card data, cookies and screenshots, and swap cryptocurrency payment addresses for the attacker's. The sites also served exploit code aimed at known flaws in older Apple iPhones and iPads, known as DarkSword and Coruna, which can take over outdated devices and extract data.

Researcher Zach Edwards noted that Optimizely's code is usually placed near the top of a page and fires immediately on load, without waiting for a consent prompt. That meant most affected visitors needed to do nothing more than open a page. Helme summed it up: trusted JavaScript does not always remain trustworthy, and a site can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own systems being breached.

Content Security Policies (CSPs), which list the domains allowed to serve content, can limit this kind of damage. Edwards said most sites do not use them, or leave them too permissive for marketing reasons. Report URI found 68 of the affected sites had no CSP, 50 had one that still allowed the payload, and only 24 (15 percent) fully blocked it. Optimizely said it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts, and is working with outside experts on an investigation.

Why it matters

Any business that embeds third-party JavaScript is exposed, because the vendor's code runs with the same access as your own and the breach never touches your infrastructure. The assumption that a reputable, long-standing vendor script is safe fails here, and with only 15 percent of affected sites fully blocking the payload, a permissive or missing CSP is shown to be the control that decided the outcome. It forces a decision about whether marketing convenience justifies leaving script sources unrestricted.

What to do

  • Deploy a Content Security Policy that lists only the domains your site genuinely needs to load scripts from.
  • Review any existing CSP for overly permissive entries added for marketing tools and tighten them.
  • Audit which third-party JavaScript files your pages load, including Optimizely if you use it.
  • Update older iPhones and iPads, as the exploit kits targeted outdated Apple devices.
supply chain attack JavaScript Optimizely Content Security Policy malware
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Summarised by CISO AI from Krebs on Security, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.