Old Log4Shell Flaw in VMware vCenter Gives Attackers Months of Access to a Software Developer's Code-Signing Server
Kaspersky's ICS CERT team has detailed a months-long compromise of a Russian software developer, after the company asked for help in June 2025. The group behind it is BO Team (also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy), which is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin and focuses on espionage and hacktivism. The victim was not named. The attackers reached servers, workstations, hypervisors, backup servers, security management servers and network equipment, and stole confidential information.
The intruders first got in through an exposed SSH service on a Linux terminal server, then scanned the internal network for reachable services. Their login attempts against the VMware vCenter web interface failed. They succeeded instead by exploiting CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) on a vCenter server running version 7.0.3, which gave them a remote command line with root privileges. From there they connected to the hypervisor over SSH.
On the hypervisor they planted a backdoor as a script named "pgcache", chosen to look like a PostgreSQL component, set to run every hour. It fetched a second script from a free dynamic DNS service, which in turn downloaded the Global Socket utility for remote control. When the attackers' server was offline, the DNS record pointed to 127.0.0.1, and changing that record was enough to activate the backdoor.
The attackers also reached many Windows servers, and used malware on only one: the server that signed the company's software builds. Kaspersky says this suggests two possible goals: injecting malicious code into a product before signing, or stealing the digital signature to sign malware later. After the company detected the intrusion and responded, the attackers lost access and launched a phishing campaign in late July, using an "Account disconnected from the mail server" email to harvest employee passwords.
Why it matters
A Log4Shell flaw from 2021 was still exploitable on a core virtualisation management server, showing that patched-looking environments can hide old critical gaps in infrastructure tools that sit outside normal patch routines. Once the hypervisor layer was owned, the attackers reached backup, security management and code-signing systems, so any assumption that these are protected by separation fails. Software developers and their customers are exposed, because a compromised signing server can turn trusted updates into a delivery channel.
What to do
- Check any VMware vCenter servers for exposure to CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) and patch or remediate them, including version 7.0.3.
- Restrict SSH so it is not exposed to the internet and is limited to approved admin hosts.
- Look for an unexpected "pgcache" script in /etc/cron.hourly/ on hypervisors and Linux hosts.
- Monitor DNS for lookups of nofrillsdns[.]com subdomains and block that service if you have no need for it.