New HTTP/3 Backdoors Used in Espionage Campaign Against Southeast Asian Governments
Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 has uncovered a multi-stage cyberespionage campaign targeting Southeast Asian government bodies since at least July 2025. The researchers track the group as TGR-STA-0049, which is also known as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon. Its operations focus on government organisations in Southeast Asia, South America and Europe, and rely on custom tools designed for stealth and long-term intelligence collection.
The group has been active since at least March 2023 and previously used a backdoor called Squidoor against Windows and Linux systems. In this latest campaign it introduced two previously undocumented remote access Trojans (RATs). PerfectPioneer RAT, written in the Go programming language, was first seen in July 2025, and Unit 42 found six variants that evolved steadily over time. Its modular successor, KUKURAT, has been seen in the wild since March 2026, as the attackers moved their infrastructure from one tool to the other.
Attackers use two routes to gain a foothold. The main one is exploiting vulnerable, unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers to install web shells, including ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5. The secondary route is phishing, using decoy PDFs and lookalike domains. One decoy impersonated a 2025 official document from Myanmar's Union Election Commission. PerfectPioneer has also been launched through DLL side-loading and decoy installers.
Both RATs use HTTP/3 as their main way of talking to command-and-control servers. Unit 42 notes this is rare in malware generally, but reflects an emerging trend among advanced threat actors. Although the targets here are governments, the entry methods are common ones: unpatched servers and convincing lures can affect any organisation that runs them.
Why it matters
Security teams that rely on inspecting traditional web traffic may have blind spots if their tools do not examine HTTP/3 (which runs over QUIC), since both RATs use it for command and control. The main entry point is unpatched Exchange and web servers, so any organisation with exposed servers, not just governments, shares the weakness. Rapid variant changes, six PerfectPioneer versions in nine months, also mean signature-based detection of one sample will age quickly.
What to do
- Patch internet-facing Microsoft Exchange and web servers as a priority.
- Hunt on web servers for known web shells such as ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5.
- Review whether your network monitoring can see and alert on outbound HTTP/3 traffic.
- Warn staff about decoy PDFs and lookalike domains impersonating official bodies.