Threat Intelligence

Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Pushed Card Skimmer and iPhone Exploit Code to Visitors of 178 Major Sites

The Hacker News · 17 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway Treat third-party scripts on your website as part of your own attack surface, and keep payment entry inside hosted payment fields so a script compromise cannot read card data.

An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation to plant malicious code in scripts that customer websites load from the service, the vendor said. Report URI, a firm that monitors website scripts, found code in 188 snippets belonging to 178 organizations, including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax. It says the true number is likely higher. Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the code removed, but its notice does not explain how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, or what customers should do.

The attacker wrote a loader into the Project JavaScript field of each customer project and left the rest of the snippet alone. Because the scripts were still served from Optimizely's own domain with its certificate, they looked legitimate. Sites that serve the snippet from their own domain were also affected. Report URI says a site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems breached. The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC, and cleanup began at about 20:40 UTC. Smartsheet's script was cleaned and then re-infected, which suggests the attacker still had access at that point.

The main payload replaces crypto wallet addresses with the attacker's own in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests. A card skimmer, added later, captures card number, expiry and CVV from a site's own form fields. It cannot read cards entered in cross-origin payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen hosted fields. Report URI cannot tell how many card numbers were exposed.

On iPhones and iPads, the code also tried to load iOS exploit kits identified as Coruna and DarkSword, which target iOS 13 to 17.2.1 and iOS 18.4 to 18.7 respectively. No real device compromise has been reported. Cynet, which retrieved the second stage using an emulated iPhone browser, described what it saw as conditional delivery, not a successful compromise.

Why it matters

Sites that trust a vendor-hosted script from a reputable domain had no signal that anything was wrong, because the certificate and domain were genuine. This breaks the assumption that a script from a trusted CDN is safe, and it shows that a single vendor flaw can reach unrelated organizations at once. Businesses with their own card forms are most exposed, while those using hosted payment iframes were shielded from the skimmer.

What to do

  • Check whether your site loads an Optimizely snippet and review its Project JavaScript for unfamiliar code.
  • Search page scripts and logs for 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol and base64-encoded variants of those addresses.
  • Use hosted payment fields such as Stripe or Adyen iframes instead of card inputs on your own pages.
  • Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
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Summarised by CISO AI from The Hacker News, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.