Threat Intelligence

Exposed Server Reveals Crypto Exchange Raid and Stockpile of 44,000 Stolen AI API Keys

SOCRadar · 17 Nov 2026
Key Takeaway Store passwords with modern salted hashing, protect database accounts tightly, and require checks on withdrawals or payments that cannot be bypassed by writing to the database.

SOCRadar researchers found a staging server at 176.65.148[.]2 serving its whole /tmp directory over port 8099. The listing held more than 1,600 files and about 700 MB of attack scripts, logs, stolen credentials and output data. SOCRadar tracks the activity as Operation ArgonHunt, after the operator's own toolkit folder, and says the files cover two operations run from the same host.

The first operation is a deep compromise of a Türkiye-based cryptocurrency exchange, which SOCRadar has not named. The files include credentials for more than a dozen MySQL accounts, one with read and write access to the production database, plus stolen admin panel and CRM source code. A password-guessing log shows a successful admin login on November 12, 2026. The admin panel stored staff passwords as unsalted MD5 hashes, and 17 of roughly 100 obtained hashes were cracked. The operator also brute-forced four- and six-digit SMS codes and targeted customer accounts with very weak bcrypt settings.

The most serious finding is a set of four Python scripts that write directly to the database, beneath the application. They swap a customer's saved withdrawal address for the operator's wallet and insert a withdrawal for 95 percent of the balance, with the origin set to 127.0.0.1 so it looks internal. Because the application is bypassed, its withdrawal checks never run. Output files list entries worth about 253,000 USDT and 4.7 BTC, and a later sweep covered about 55,600 USDT, 15.87 ETH and 0.134 BTC. SOCRadar did not verify on-chain settlement, so these are attempted thefts, not confirmed losses.

The second operation is an automated pipeline that harvests, validates and stockpiles API keys for major AI providers. SOCRadar's analysis was passive: it did not use any credential found or touch victim systems.

Why it matters

Application-level controls such as withdrawal checks fail completely when an attacker holds database credentials, because records written directly never pass through them. Any business that treats its app logic as the main safeguard, and leaves privileged database accounts reachable or weakly protected, shares this exposure. The weak MD5 and low-cost bcrypt hashes also show how quickly stored credentials fall once data is copied.

What to do

  • Replace unsalted MD5 password hashes with a modern salted algorithm.
  • Raise the bcrypt cost factor above the minimum setting of 4.
  • Restrict database accounts to least privilege and limit access by IP address.
  • Rate-limit and lock out repeated SMS and reset code attempts.
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Summarised by CISO AI from SOCRadar, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.