eMudhra Revokes 8 More Certificate Authorities After Faulty Script Exposed Key Handling Failures
eMudhra has revoked 8 more intermediate certificate authorities (CAs), following an October key compromise caused by its own Python script. These CAs use private keys to sign the certificates the company issues. The company had told Mozilla on October 19 that these RSA-based CAs were not impacted. It now says that although the script did not weaken their keys, it cannot show the keys were handled as its own rules require. Of the 8, 6 were for website (TLS) certificates and 2 were for code signing. Four entered production in May, and 195 certificates are listed as issued from them.
The problems trace back to a key ceremony on April 30, 2025, where 16 CA keys were generated on Utimaco hardware security modules (HSMs). They were meant to move to Crypto4A HSMs, and because transfers between vendors are limited, the team wrote a script to wrap and unwrap each key. For the practice run, the source HSM's FIPS-approved mode was switched off as an approved exception. The script then read each private key into the ceremony computer's memory and rebuilt it from that copy. For the 8 ECDSA keys, a single line cut the private value to its leading byte. The rebuilt key had a near-identical label, so the weak copy was sent for signing and certification.
The Hacker News worked out all 8 weakened keys from their public certificates. The smallest is 4 and the largest is 237. This article covers only the opening of the report, not the full story.