Cybersecurity Research

COLD RELIC: How One Cloud Breach Fuels the Next Impersonation Attack

Key Takeaway Treat any unexpected message from a known contact as suspect, even on a trusted channel, and confirm it through a separate route before clicking or replying.

Mandiant has detailed a series of linked intrusions by COLD RELIC, a Russian state-sponsored group (also known as COLDRIVER, Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear). The US Department of Justice has assessed the group operates within Russia's Federal Security Service. Its targets include government officials, defense contractors and non-governmental organizations across Europe and North America.

The key finding is how the group turns one breach into the next. In late 2025, COLD RELIC downloaded a large volume of data from a US organization, searching for names, email addresses and email archives. In 2026, Mandiant investigated a second US organization where phishing link parameters and impersonation pretexts suggested the attackers used contact and relationship context from the first victim. Responders found the attackers made contact over an encrypted messaging app while posing as an employee of the first organization.

Phishing links are a hallmark of the group. A compromised website acts as the first link and redirects the target to the real phishing domain, hiding that domain and letting the attackers fingerprint visitors to decide whether to redirect them. The link often ends with an attacker-set parameter that points to a previous victim or the lure topic.

In the late-2025 intrusion, the attackers used a residential proxy network in the US, close to the victim, and logged in with the stolen credentials of a Super Admin account. They then ran an MFA push notification fatigue attack, and once the user accepted a request, they registered a device model never before seen in that tenant. To keep access, they used passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue MFA devices. Google says it has seen evidence of new phishing operations as recently as November 2026.

Why it matters

A breach at one organization now becomes a risk for its partners, clients and peers, because stolen contacts and email history make impersonation highly convincing. Push-based MFA failed here because a single accepted prompt let attackers enrol their own devices, passkeys and backup codes, so access can outlast a password reset. Smaller firms that work with government, defense or NGO clients should assume they may be targeted through trust relationships rather than directly.

What to do

  • Review admin accounts for newly registered MFA devices, passkeys and backup codes, especially device models never seen in your tenant.
  • Investigate repeated MFA push prompts the user did not initiate, and train staff to deny and report them.
  • Verify unexpected contact from known people, including on encrypted messaging apps, through a separate channel.
  • Check sign-ins from residential IP addresses that sit unusually close to the user's location for Super Admin accounts.
COLD RELIC Russia Phishing MFA fatigue Cloud security Impersonation

Summarised by CISO AI from Google Threat Intelligence, written with Claude Sonnet 5.5. We link back to every original so you can read it yourself.