CISA Targets About 100 Critical Infrastructure Companies for Security Hardening Talks
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has identified about 100 companies that own critical infrastructure for conversations on strengthening their systems. Acting director Nick Andersen said the companies were chosen because of how vital they are to the nation. He described this as an initial workstream, and said the figure does not cover everyone CISA wants to speak with.
The list was built in two steps. First, an intergovernmental Homeland Defense Working Group identified companies providing functions considered most important to the economy, public health and safety, national security and defence. Then CISA overlaid five to six years of intelligence on what cyber adversaries seem to value most, such as where they were pre-positioning or where their research and development budgets were going. Companies appearing on both lists became the targets for initial engagement, and the relevant sector risk management agencies are being involved.
Andersen said interdependencies matter. If a particular port is judged especially important, CISA would speak to the port operator, but also to its energy and telecommunications providers. He said the ideal conversation includes IT and operational technology providers as well as cybersecurity providers. The effort supports CISA's "CISA 2030" strategy, which focuses on resilience, minimum viability and related priorities.
So far, Andersen said, the talks have been productive. Many have included CI-Fortify assessments, which prompt discussion on planning for isolation and recovery. He expects more conversations in the coming weeks and months about appropriate investment and long-term resilience, which he called a collective effort. Andersen and other Trump administration officials have also said they want to be selective in prioritising vulnerabilities and hacking targets.
Why it matters
The prioritisation shows that agencies are ranking organisations by adversary interest as well as by size, so firms that supply energy, telecommunications or IT and operational technology services to important operators may be pulled into scrutiny even if they are not on the list. It also signals that isolation and recovery planning, not only prevention, is what government is now testing. Security leaders in supply chains should assume their customers will start asking for evidence of both.
What to do
- Map which critical services your business depends on, such as energy, telecommunications and IT or operational technology providers.
- Document a plan for isolating compromised systems and recovering operations.
- Ask key suppliers how they plan for isolation and recovery.