Attackers Spray ScreenConnect Servers to Hijack MSP Technician Workstations via CVE-2026-84869
Huntress has confirmed that attackers are exploiting CVE-2026-84869, a critical ScreenConnect client flaw (CVSS 9.9) that lets a guest in a remote session push a file to a connecting technician's computer and have the technician's own client run it. ConnectWise disclosed the flaw on September 8, 2026, and CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 11.
On November 12, Huntress saw a managed service provider (MSP) technician's workstation run a guest-pushed batch file. Within about 9 seconds, the script reported to a Telegram bot, downloaded an installer from masterdarky[.]com, and started a rebranded ScreenConnect client, named after Windows Update, that connected to the attacker's own relay. A second technician's client ran an attacker "canary" file on November 13, and at least four more technicians were exposed to guest-pushed files in October, including a path-traversal attempt to drop a file in a Startup folder.
The activity looks like blind spraying. Since October 20, Huntress has seen at least 688,000 guest "run file" requests for update-style batch files hit 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers from 29 IP addresses. The attackers simply wait for any technician to join a session. The technician sees no prompt; they only need to join, whether on an attacker-controlled session or a real customer session the attacker has joined as an extra guest.
This is separate from other recent campaigns, including worm-like SCKit activity that appears to abuse a vulnerable third-party server extension, and a campaign planting guest sessions with crypto exchange names on more than 100 MSP servers. An MSP technician's workstation typically holds RMM consoles, saved credentials and access to every customer, which makes it a high-value target.
Why it matters
The control that failed is the assumption that a technician decides what moves and runs during a session; here the client runs guest-pushed files with no prompt. Server-side patching is not enough, because the exposure sits on every technician's endpoint, and a single compromised workstation can give an attacker a path into all of an MSP's customers. Small businesses that depend on an MSP inherit this risk even if they never run ScreenConnect themselves.
What to do
- Update every technician's ScreenConnect host client and Access agent to 26.6.5 or later.
- Remove the TransferFiles permission as an interim mitigation where patching is delayed.
- Hunt for the ScreenConnect host client spawning scripts from its Temp folder.
- Review server logs for guest "run file" requests for update.bat or update_<8 hex>.bat, and block masterdarky[.]com.