Alleged Russian Operative Charged Over Physical and Wireless Spying on US Defense-Tech Staff
A Russian national, Igor D'iu, is in US custody after being indicted for allegedly spying on a large technology and defense company in Palo Alto. According to an FBI affidavit, the operation ran from June to October 2026 and was directed through Telegram by contacts he only suspected were Russian government representatives. The company is unnamed in court documents, though media reports have identified it as Palantir, which did not respond to The Register's request for confirmation.
The filing alleges D'iu was told to photograph employees' screens while they worked remotely from coffee shops, and to let his handlers remotely control his laptop so they could collect data from nearby company-owned devices. He was also allegedly asked to leave a laptop outside an employee's apartment complex, once for an hour and once for three hours overnight, while handlers operated it remotely.
The affidavit also describes D'iu following two female employees by car. One was followed for nearly 30 miles until she drove to a police station on the advice of a 911 call handler. D'iu allegedly confirmed he was the driver but said he wanted to ask her on a date. The FBI notes Russian intelligence has a history of recruiting criminal proxies and other disposable agents.
Investigators say D'iu entered the US illegally, reaching Texas around 31 July with help from contacts in Mexico. They allege he was paid $15,000 on three occasions between 12 August and 6 October, verified by a photo of a dollar bill's serial number, and used the money to buy equipment, rent accommodation and rent a car. That car was allegedly captured on security footage outside the company's office on 1 September. The FBI raided his temporary premises in October, and Telegram messages from his seized devices reportedly confirmed its findings.
Why it matters
This case shows that determined state-linked actors can bypass network defences by targeting people directly: their screens in public, their homes and the wireless devices around them. Businesses with staff working remotely in cafes, especially those in defense or sensitive supply chains, can't assume endpoint and network controls cover the whole risk. It also shows that low-skill, hired proxies can be used for this work, so the threat does not depend on advanced technical capability.
What to do
- Require privacy screens for staff who work on company laptops in public places.
- Disable automatic Wi-Fi and Bluetooth connections on company devices when working away from the office.
- Brief staff on how to report being followed or approached suspiciously, including to police and security teams.