Ageing Government IT Is Handing Hostile States an Easy Way In
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation recently announced that it detected and disrupted another Chinese state-sponsored cyberattack aimed at US critical infrastructure. It follows the 2025 PlugX malware incident, the 2024 Flax Typhoon hack and the 2023 Volt Typhoon operation. The article argues this pattern shows adversaries probing for any weakness, and sometimes cooperating to exploit it. Many of these attacks target federal networks directly, and too often they succeed.
The author says the root problem is tech debt. Federal systems have been assembled over decades, shaped by unpredictable budgets, shifting missions and procurement rules that reward small fixes over real modernisation. Agencies often run three or four generations of technology at once, such as legacy databases under cloud environments, with service providers and internal teams each managing different layers, often without a shared map of what connects to what. Security tends to be added later, after missions and compliance demands have changed.
The spending picture is stark. A 2025 R Street Institute report puts federal IT spending above US$100 billion a year, with as much as 80 percent going to operating and maintaining existing systems. Meanwhile, the article says adversaries can now use agentic AI to automate reconnaissance, speed up exploitation of known vulnerabilities and move through supply chains before a patch cycle finishes. Fragmented networks may also leave government unable to keep operating in a crisis with China or Russia.
The author calls on Congress to treat modernisation as a security priority, much like defence weapons acquisition. Proposals include faster procurement pathways for trusted security technology, vendor contracts that make responsibility after a breach clear within hours rather than weeks, and less duplication of platforms that widen the attack surface without adding capability.
Why it matters
The piece shows that security failures often come from unclear ownership and layered legacy systems, not just missing tools. Any business with old platforms, several IT providers and no single map of connections shares this exposure. It also forces a decision on whether maintenance spending is buying safety or just preserving risk, and on whether contracts say who is accountable after a breach.
What to do
- Build and maintain a single inventory map showing which systems connect to which.
- Assign each system and each layer to a named owner, including managed service providers.
- Review supplier contracts so responsibility after a breach is clearly defined.
- Retire duplicate or outdated platforms that add attack surface without business value.